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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ESTABLISHMENT AND EXCLUSION: WHY THE PROTECTION OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SHOULD
BE APPLIED TO ADULTS

Imagine the following scenario: After struggling to find a teaching
position, a Midwesterner is fortunate enough to find employment in a public
school, though it requires him to relocate over 1,000 miles to the Gulf Coast.
On the morning of his first day as a teacher, he wakes with a sense of
excitement and anxiety; the district convocation will be his first interaction
with his colleagues. As he walks into the high school auditorium, he is amazed
by the buzz of the nearly one thousand district employees in the room.
The teacher takes a seat in the section reserved for his campus and makes
some brief introductions to the people around him. Two gentlemen—one of
whom he later learns is the school board president—stroll to the stage. A hush
settles over the room. The board president then grabs the microphone and asks
the audience to rise for the prayer to be given by the minister beside him. The
teacher’s heart skips a beat. Though he belongs to a religious denomination,
he feels strongly that it is wrong for the school to be leading a prayer. What
should he do? Should he stand silently? Should he walk out or remain seated,
and, if so, how will his colleagues react? Will he be labeled a troublemaker?
Will he be harassed or ostracized? Could there be employment ramifications
because he is a probationary employee and can be non-renewed without any
explanation? Does the Constitution allow public schools to sponsor or endorse
such prayers?
The situation described is not merely a fanciful law school hypothetical; it
is a personal experience of this author and represents an undeveloped area in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. There have been numerous school prayer
cases before the courts, but these cases have primarily focused on the rights of
students, not teachers.1 In fact, on at least one occasion, the Supreme Court
expressly noted that it was not addressing whether its Establishment Clause

1. Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 2004). See also Alexander A.
Minard, Note, But Could They Pray at UVA? The Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Supreme
Court’s School Prayer Jurisprudence to the Virginia Military Institute’s Adult Cadets, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 997, 1022 (2005) (noting that Justice Scalia argued the Court should grant
certiorari and review Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003), to determine whether the
principles of Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), applied to adults).
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jurisprudence would be the same if applied to adults.2 One exception is the
case of Warnock v. Archer. In Warnock, the Eighth Circuit held that the
Devalls Bluff Arkansas Public School District violated the Establishment
Clause by offering prayers at mandatory teacher functions.3 Strangely, despite
the absence of case law in this area, Warnock has largely been ignored by
courts and scholars. Nevertheless, Warnock provides an opportunity to explore
how the Establishment Clause applies to adults.
One of the underlying concerns of the courts in school Establishment
Clause cases is that “students at elementary and secondary schools are minors
in a position of relative powerlessness and high impressionability” and are
therefore susceptible to religious coercion.4 The implication is that adults
cannot be coerced. The Eighth Circuit seems to have embraced this notion in
Warnock, for although it held that the school district violated the Establishment
Clause by endorsing religion, it brushed aside the plaintiff’s arguments that the
prayers created a coercive environment.5 The court found it unlikely that the
plaintiff could be coerced given that he was an adult and a contractual
employee.6
The Warnock court was correct, under Supreme Court precedent, in
finding the school district’s actions unconstitutional, even without any degree
of coercion.7 However, the argument that adults cannot be coerced is troubling
as it trivializes and overlooks the potential ramifications (e.g., ostracism,
harassment and employment-related consequences) of not conforming to a
mode of worship chosen by the school community.8 In making this argument,
the Warnock court failed to see that government endorsement of religion is
inherently coercive. That is, government endorsement of religion sends the
message that religious minorities and non-believers are outsiders; it creates a
divisive environment where minority groups must choose either to conform to
the majority’s religious views or risk ostracism, harassment or worse.
This comment argues that the protections of the Establishment Clause are
not age-dependent but should be applicable to teachers and other adults in

2. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593. After discussing the unconstitutionality of forcing a student
to choose between participating in a religious exercise at graduation or protesting and thereby
risking alienation, the Court stated: “We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the
affected citizens are mature adults. . . .” Id.
3. Warnock, 380 F.3d at 1076.
4. Minard, supra note 1, at 998–99.
5. Warnock, 380 F.3d at 1080–81.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
8. Also troubling is the fact that courts have embraced the idea that adults are immune to
coercion without any scientific evidence to support such an assertion. See Deanna N. Pihos,
Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause at Public
Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1365–66 (2005).
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public schools. Extending the protection to adults is consistent with the central
purpose of the Establishment Clause as espoused by the Supreme Court: to
prevent religious divisiveness and persecution.9 In our increasingly pluralistic
society,10 this purpose grows ever more important. Part I offers a brief
historical background on the creation of the Establishment Clause. It then
traces the evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and focuses on
school prayer cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and the reasoning behind
the Court’s opinions. Part II examines the case history in Warnock and
compares its jurisprudence with the school prayer cases from Part I. The
section then contrasts Warnock with Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
cases involving adults in other settings, which include higher education and
prisons, and offers the author’s critiques as to the jurisprudence in each. Part
III discusses the importance of extending the protections of the Establishment
Clause to adults. It illustrates the consequences that individuals must face
when challenging government endorsement of religion, addresses the troubling
realities facing religious minorities and non-believers today, and concludes that
the Warnock court’s decision to ignore the coercive element of schoolendorsed prayer could have disastrous consequences for religious dissenters.
I. A SURVEY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE—THE SUPREME
COURT AND SCHOOL PRAYER
A.

The Historical Foundation of the Establishment Clause

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .”11
The meaning of these clauses has been hotly debated, but such was not always
the case. As one scholar has noted, “[t]he great enigma of the Religion
Clauses . . . is the fact that they occasioned so little discussion during their
enactment.”12 The Constitution contained no reference to God or religion
other than to prohibit religious tests for officeholders.13 It is possible that this

9. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 432–33.
10. According to a 2007 estimate, the breakdown of religious affiliation in America is as
follows: Protestant 51.3%, Roman Catholic 23.9%, Mormon 1.7%, Jewish 1.7%, Buddhist 0.7%,
Muslim 0.6%, other or unspecified 2.5%, unaffiliated 12.1%, none 4%. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html. See also Membership of Religious Groups in U.S., in THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2008, at 710–11 (Readers Digest Trade Publishing
2008) (1868).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. 2 JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 29
(2004).
13. RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT? SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 16 (2d ed. 2005).
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silence stemmed from the fact that the Framers of the Constitution found the
topic too divisive.14 Whatever the reason, the “godlessness” of the
Constitution troubled some Christians.15 When it became clear that a Bill of
Rights was necessary to secure ratification of the Constitution, the protection
of religious freedom was one of the amendments presented to Congress by
James Madison.16
Details on the creation and adoption of the First Amendment’s religion
clauses are scant.17 The only record of the debate in the House of
Representatives is an unofficial summary drawn from accounts found in
contemporary newspapers, and the Senate debated the amendment in secret.18
However, based upon recorded votes, it is clear that the Senate rejected other
potential versions of the amendment that would have allowed government to
aid religion on a non-preferential basis.19
To understand the foundation of the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, it is also important to briefly discuss two key documents: James
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785)
and Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut.
In the former, Madison outlined his opposition to a bill before the Virginia
legislature that would have established a tax to support Christian ministers in
the state.20 The bill, sponsored by Patrick Henry, would have allowed
taxpayers to choose which Christian sect or denomination would receive the
money.21

14. HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 31.
15. Id.
16. PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL 13–15 (2007). The amendment was originally the third of
seventeen amendments proposed by Madison. Id. at 14–15.
17. FLOWERS, supra note 13, at 17.
18. Id.; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 257–58 (2d ed. rev., Univ. of N.C. Press 1994) (1986). For a full account of the
House debate, see LEVY, supra, at 96–99. Levy notes that some of the problems with the House
report were that reporters took few shorthand notes and often filled in the gaps by relying upon
their memories, which sometimes produced inconsistent accounts. Id. at 257–58.
19. FLOWERS, supra note 13, at 17. One of the proposed versions stated: “Congress shall
make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others.” Id. Not everyone
agrees that the First Amendment was intended to prevent Congress from aiding religious groups,
provided it did so on a non-preferential basis. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a rejection of the non-preferentialist argument, see LEVY, supra
note 18, at 112–45, and Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). For those interested in the nonpreferentialist argument, see generally DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002) and ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1988).
20. FLOWERS, supra note 13, at 15.
21. Id.
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Madison attacked the bill on multiple fronts. One of his objections was
that the tax would incite conflict between religious groups; that it would
“destroy the moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to
intermeddle with Religion, has produced. . . .”22 History had shown that
governmental establishment of religion caused tremendous bloodshed. This
bill threatened to do the same. “Who does not see,” Madison asked, “that the
same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians,
in exclusion of all other Sects?”23 The bill was “a signal of persecution,” as it
implied that those who held religious beliefs different from those in political
power did not enjoy the same standing within the community.24 Though
Madison conceded that the establishment here was a far cry from religious
persecutions throughout history, he contended that the bill represented merely
a beginning, a stage of religious persecution: “Distant as it may be, in its
present form, from the Inquisition it differs from it only in degree. The one is
the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance.”25
In 1802, President Thomas Jefferson received a letter from the Danbury
Baptists. In the letter, the Baptists voiced their displeasure at having to pay
taxes to support the Congregational Church, the established church of
Connecticut.26 Jefferson’s response did not address whether it was improper
for a state to establish a religion. However, Jefferson noted his agreement that
religion should be a personal matter, adding: “I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion’ . . .
thus building a wall of separation between church and state.”27
It is debatable whether Madison and Jefferson believed in a strict
separation of church and state28 or whether their views on the subject even
truly matter.29 After all, Jefferson was not present at the Constitutional

22. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted
in STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 7 (2d ed. 2006).
23. Id. at 4–5.
24. Id. at 6 (“It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”).
25. Id.
26. IRONS, supra note 16, at 23.
27. LEVY, supra note 18, at 246 (quoting the Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury
Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)).
28. See, e.g., HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 23–28. Saint Louis University History
Professor James Hitchcock cautions that a strict separationist view was not universally accepted
even in Virginia. Id. at 28.
29. See, e.g., id. at 28. Justice William Brennan was among those who believed that the
original intent of the Founders could not be known with any certainty. Moreover, Justice
Brennan maintained that, even if the original intent of the Founders could be determined, it would
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Convention, nor did he help draft the First Amendment.30 Furthermore,
Madison’s actions—such as his support for congressional chaplains and his
presidential proclamations of official days of thanksgiving—did not always
comport with his strict separationist rhetoric, though he later lamented that
these actions had been unconstitutional.31 Madison characterized his support
for governmental endorsement of religion as a failure to live up to the ideals of
the Constitution, a failure that was the product of political pressure during
exigent circumstances.32 Whether Madison or Jefferson truly advocated a
strict separation between church and state is beyond the scope of this
comment; what is important is that the strict separationist rhetoric embodied in
the aforementioned documents became central to the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.33
B.

Students, School Prayer, and the Supreme Court—The Court Looks to
Madison and Jefferson

Any attempt to synthesize the Supreme Court’s reasoning in school prayer
cases into a manageable and consistent jurisprudence is tricky at best.34
Ironically, our starting point, Everson v. Board of Education,35 is a case that
did not concern school prayer. Moreover, the case’s novelty is not just that it
incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment and
established modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence;36 it was also the first
time a Supreme Court justice expressly relied upon the personal beliefs of
Jefferson and Madison to interpret the Establishment Clause.37
It might seem surprising to many law students today that, until the late
nineteenth century, the Court rarely looked to the Founders for guidance on

not be particularly relevant or useful given the changes that have taken place in American society.
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234–41 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. See HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 28.
31. Id. at 27–28. Madison confessed his regret in a private memorandum written after the
end of his presidency. The memorandum was discovered over a century later. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 27 (“[H]e saw his acquiescence . . . as lapses from principle, dictated by the
particular circumstances of the time, such as the War of 1812, while he was president.”).
33. Id. at 6–7.
34. See e.g. Warnock v. Archer, 38 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the Court’s
use of various tests to determine Establishment Clause violations complicates making such
determinations); Minard, supra note 1, at 1000 (noting the inconsistency of the Court’s
jurisprudence).
35. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
36. HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 5; LEVY, supra note 18, at 149–50. However, Peter Irons
argues that the First Amendment’s religious clauses were “effectively incorporated” in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), though the opinion was in fact restricted to the Free
Exercise Clause. IRONS, supra note 16, at 19.
37. HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 6.
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constitutional interpretation of the religion clauses.38 It was not until the 1878
Mormon polygamy cases that the Court considered “the opinion of the
Founders as normative” with respect to the First Amendment’s religious
clauses.39 Thereafter, until 1947, the Court largely ignored the Founders’
intent when interpreting these clauses.40 Everson changed that and made the
intent of the Founders an integral part of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.41
In Everson, the Court addressed whether a local school board violated the
Constitution by authorizing reimbursement to parents for expenses they
incurred sending their children to school on the public bus transportation
system.42 The plaintiff, asserting his standing as a taxpayer, alleged the
reimbursement violated the Establishment Clause because parents who used
the public school buses to send their children to parochial schools were also
reimbursed.43 Finding no constitutional violation, the Court reasoned that the
money was not used to support religious schools but was a “general program”
intended to help all children get to school.44
Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black noted that although colonists
had come to America for religious freedom, many of these same colonists had
themselves persecuted religious dissenters.45 Justice Black contended that
such persecution, combined with resentment over taxes to support established
churches, caused many Americans to believe that government should not be
involved in religion.46 He reminded the Court that Madison had assailed a
similar tax in Memorial and Remonstrance.47 Additionally, Justice Black
pointed out that the Court had previously recognized that the First Amendment
was intended “to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion”
that Madison and Jefferson had secured in Virginia.48
According to Justice Black, the purpose of the Establishment Clause was
to “suppress” the “evils” caused by governmental endorsement of religion—
namely religious strife and persecution.49 Justice Black laid out a broad
interpretation of the Establishment Clause:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1947).
Id.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 8–10.
Id. at 11.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14–15. See also HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 5–6.
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can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church . . . or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
50
religion.

Drawing upon Thomas Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists, Justice Black
invoked Jefferson’s statement that the First Amendment constituted “a wall of
separation between Church and State.”51 Justice Black maintained that this
“wall must be kept high and impregnable,” and not even the slightest breach
could be allowed. Here, he found no breach.52
Though it may seem strange given the modern debate over the meaning of
the Establishment Clause, there was no disagreement on the Court regarding
Justice Black’s interpretation;53 the disagreement was over the application of
the principles Black announced.54 The four dissenting justices concurred with
the strict separationist view of the First Amendment but rejected the conclusion
that there had been no breach.55 Justice Wiley Rutledge’s dissent, joined by
every justice in the minority, drew expressly on the views of James Madison to
explain the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Viewing the First
Amendment as a “compact and exact summation” of Madison’s beliefs forged
during his “long struggle for religious freedom,”56 Justice Rutledge declared
that the intent behind the clause was not merely to prevent Congress from
establishing a national church or religion.57 Rather, the Founders intended the
Establishment Clause to completely sever all ties between church and state and
to prohibit “every form of public aid or support for religion.”58
C. School Prayer and Government Endorsement
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of school prayer in Engel v.
Vitale.59 The controversy arose when the New Hyde Park School Board
decided that a 22-word prayer written by the New York State Board of Regents
(Regents) would be recited daily in its schools.60 The Regents recommended
that all schools adopt the prayer as a way to instill moral and spiritual values in

50. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
51. Id. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
52. Id. at 18.
53. HITCHCOCK, supra note 12, at 7.
54. Id.
55. LEVY, supra note 18, at 151 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 31–32 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)).
56. Everson, 330 U.S. at 31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 31–32.
58. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
59. FLOWERS, supra note 13, at 103.
60. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
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students.61 Due to the religious diversity in New York, the Regents intended to
write a nonsectarian prayer that would encompass all religions and
denominations.62 Though the prayer was to be recited “by each class in the
presence of a teacher,”63 school district policy allowed students to be excused
from saying the prayer upon written request of their parents.64
Ten students, through their parents, challenged the prayer’s
constitutionality by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause.65 The
state courts upheld the use of the prayer provided that students would not be
required to participate.66 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and ruled that
New York had violated the Establishment Clause by encouraging religious
activity in public schools.67 Writing again for the Court, Justice Black rejected
the argument that the prayer was justified based upon our country’s religious
heritage.68 Rather, Justice Black stated that it was “this very practice” of
government prescribing religious orthodoxy that caused many colonists to
leave England.69 Examining the history of religion in America from colonial
times through the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Justice Black concluded that,
at a bare minimum, the Establishment Clause prohibits states from
“compos[ing] official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as
a part of a religious program carried on by government.”70
The fact that the prayer was non-denominational and that students could
either remain silent or leave the room failed to cure the constitutional
defects.71 Though courts must find some element of governmental coercion to
find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause has no
such requirement.72 Simply by endorsing religion, New York violated the
Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the Court did not dismiss the notion that
governmental endorsement of religion can be coercive. It noted that history
had shown that state endorsement of religion and coercion go hand-in-hand,
that “[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
FLOWERS, supra note 13, at 103.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.
FLOWERS, supra note 13, at 103.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
Id. at 430.
Id.
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religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.”73
In his concurrence, Justice William O. Douglas disagreed with the
argument that the prayer was coercive.74 Justice Douglas contended that the
students were not compelled to recite the prayer and could leave the room
without fear of retaliation.75 Because students could opt out, only teachers
were required to recite the prayer, and none of them was complaining.76
Justice Douglas did not find the prayer inherently coercive either. After all,
Justice Douglas reasoned, adults were compelled to witness prayers delivered
at the opening of Congress and the Supreme Court, yet these prayers passed
constitutional muster.77
Perhaps responding to Justice Douglas, the majority conceded that the
establishment of religion in this case (composing a brief prayer that was to be
recited) paled in comparison to historical religious persecution. However, it
revived Madison’s argument from Memorial and Remonstrance that a
government that could prefer Christianity to another religion could also prefer
one Christian denomination to another.78 Thus, the Court embraced a slippery
slope argument; that any governmental endorsement, any crack in the wall of
separation of church and state, would ultimately lead to the type of religious
establishment and coercion that the First Amendment had been intended to
prevent.
Only one year after Engel, the Court again confronted the issue of school
prayer. In School District v. Schempp, the Court ruled that a Pennsylvania
statute requiring the daily reading of Bible verses in public schools violated the
Establishment Clause.79 Each day in Abington Senior High School, a student
in the school’s television and radio class would choose and recite ten verses
from the King James Version of the Bible to be broadcast over the school’s
intercom.80 Per state law, no comments, questions or explanations regarding
the verses were made.81 The recitation of the Bible verses was followed by the

73. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring).
75. Engel, 370 U.S. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76. Id. This raises interesting questions that go to the heart of this comment: Do adults have
the same rights under the Establishment Clause? Is there no constitutional violation unless one
complains? Can we assume the teachers’ silence meant that they were in favor of the prayer?
77. Id. at 439–42.
78. Id. at 436–37.
79. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 203 (1963). Schempp involves companion cases.
In the other case, Madalyn Murray, an atheist, and her son challenged a Baltimore statute that
allowed recitation of the Lord’s Prayer as well as the reading of Bible versus. Id. at 211. My
focus here is on the Schempp family.
80. Id. at 206–07.
81. Id.
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Lord’s Prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance, again broadcast over the
intercom.82 In schools without an intercom system, the procedure was
generally the same, except the teachers would choose the Bible verses to be
read, which would then be read aloud in class.83
Though the Pennsylvania law allowed students to be excused from the
Bible reading or to leave the room upon written request of their parents,84
Edward Schempp—who believed the practice conflicted with his family’s
Unitarian views and violated their religious liberty—found this remedy
inadequate.85 Schempp expressed concern that those religious dissenters who
left the room would find their relationships with their peers and teachers
damaged.86 He feared his children would be labeled “odd-balls” or “atheists,”
a term that carried with it the image that one was a communist or “‘unAmerican,’ with overtones of possible immorality.”87
The State defended the Bible reading on the grounds that it did not favor
any one specific Christian denomination,88 and that it had secular purposes,
which included the promotion of morality and the teaching of literature.89 The
Court was unimpressed. Acknowledging that historically religion held a
prominent place in American society and government, the Court nonetheless
proclaimed that the principle of religious freedom was equally vital given the
religious pluralism of American society.90
In the majority opinion, Justice Tom Clark “rejected unequivocally” the
notion that government could aid or support religion without violating the
Establishment Clause, even if it did so in a non-preferential manner.91 In the
twenty years preceding Schempp, the Court heard at least seven Establishment
Clause cases, each time reaffirming the principles announced in Everson.92
Summarizing the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Justice Clark
formulated an endorsement test, which would later become part of the Lemon

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206–07.
85. See id. at 208–09 n.3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 210.
89. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
90. Id. at 214. The Court noted that there were eighty-three religious groups in America that
had over 50,000 members, as well as many smaller religious sects. Id.
91. Id. at 216.
92. See id. at 222. Justice Clark mentions that there were eight cases, and he starts with
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), instead of Everson. Among the cases discussed by
Clark were Everson, Engel, and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), in which the Warren
Court invalidated a state requirement that officeholders proclaim a belief in God. Schempp, 374
U.S. at 220.
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test:93 to be constitutional, the law or governmental action must have a secular
purpose and could neither advance nor inhibit religion.94
Applying Justice Clark’s test to the facts in Schempp, the majority held the
Establishment Clause had been violated.95 By requiring public school students
to read Bible verses and recite the Lord’s Prayer in the classroom as part of a
state-prescribed curriculum, Pennsylvania had impermissibly mandated
students to partake in religious exercises.96 Just as in Engel, the Court found
the mere fact that students could be excused from participation did not cure the
statute’s unconstitutionality. Furthermore, the Court resisted the temptation to
deem the practices acceptable because they were “minor encroachments” upon
religious liberty.97 After all, as Madison wrote in Memorial and
Remonstrance, what might begin as a de minimis encroachment upon one’s
rights could easily become a larger encroachment.98 The implication was
clear: any establishment of religion is merely an invitation to religious conflict
and a step toward religious persecution.
Moreover, Justice Brennan’s concurrence seemed to embrace the argument
that the prayers were inherently coercive. Though children could theoretically
opt out of the religious exercises, Justice Brennan professed a belief that very
few children would actually do so,99 for children would be placed in the
difficult position of choosing to follow their religious beliefs or conforming to
peer norms.100 Fearing that they would be ostracized or labeled as atheists or
other unfavorable terms, most children would silently suffer the religious
exercises rather than risk being stigmatized or ostracized by their peers.101
For Justice Brennan, whether the Founders would have approved of prayer
and Bible reading in public schools was not only unable to be known with any

93. The test was formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a case involving
state aid to religious schools. Id. at 603. The test was a synthesis of three tests the Court had
used at that time to determine whether the Establishment Clause had been violated. The law had
to have a secular purpose, could neither advance nor inhibit religion, and could not excessively
entangle government with religion. Id. at 612–13.
94. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor refined the endorsement test in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Her twopart test asked first whether government actually intended to endorse or show disapproval of a
religion. If so, it violated the Establishment Clause. However, even if the government did not
violate the first prong of the test, its actions could still be found unconstitutional if a reasonable
person perceived its primary effect as advancing religion. Minard, supra note 1, at 1005.
95. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222–23.
96. Id. at 223.
97. Id. at 225.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 289–92 (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 290–92 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 289–92.
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certainty,102 but it was also irrelevant. America had grown more religiously
diverse than the Founders likely ever imagined.103 This religious pluralism
made it virtually impossible for a state to prescribe a prayer that would not
offend the religious liberties of some group.104
Invoking Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous phrase that “it is a
constitution we are expounding,” Justice Brennan asserted that the Court’s role
is to translate the protections of the First Amendment to modern society.105
The Court should not focus on whether the Founders would have specifically
approved of the school’s practices; instead it should determine whether the
practices in question were likely to produce the consequences the Founders had
hoped the Establishment Clause would prevent.106 And among those
consequences (those “evils” as Justice Black described them in Everson107), are
religious divisiveness and persecution.
D. The Interplay Between Endorsement and Coercion
Though the Court in Engel and Schempp only tangentially addressed the
issue of coercion,108 a coercion test became integral to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in Lee v. Weisman.109 The issue in Weisman was whether a
school district’s practice of inviting clergy to give an invocation and
benediction at graduation violated the Establishment Clause.110 Daniel
Weisman first complained of the practice when Robert E. Lee, principal at
Nathan Bishop Middle School, invited a Baptist minister to give the invocation
at the school’s graduation in which one of Weisman’s daughters was

102. Id. at 235–36. Justice Brennan listed several problems with interpreting the Framers’
intent. For consistency, I have chosen the word “Founders,” as it also includes Thomas Jefferson.
Among the problems cited by Justice Brennan was a lack of clarity as to what each of the
Founders thought. Moreover, Justice Brennan thought it impossible to know what the Founders
would have thought about prayer in public schools because public schools had not existed in their
time. Id. at 238–46.
103. See id. at 240.
104. Id. at 287.
105. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 241 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819))
(Brennan, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 236.
107. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947).
108. The majority in Engel acknowledged that coercion naturally results anytime government
endorses one religion or one religious sect over another. The Court in Schempp does not directly
discuss coercion. However, the Court’s slippery slope argument that de minimis violations of
religious liberty can lead to full-scale religious persecution hints that the Court considered
establishment inherently coercive. Justice Brennan’s concurrence, of course, explicitly describes
the coercive aspect of the prayers and Bible reading.
109. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
110. Id. at 581.
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participating.111 Weisman was unsuccessful in obtaining a court injunction.112
Only three years later, the issue arose once again because another Weisman
daughter was graduating.113 This time Principal Lee invited a rabbi, perhaps
believing this would placate the Weismans, who were Jewish.114 He was
wrong.115
Justice Anthony Kennedy penned the opinion of the Court, which held that
“at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith or tends to do
so.’”116 Justice Kennedy focused on the school’s endorsement of the religious
exercise and the coercive element that arose as a result.117 Here, the school’s
involvement in the religious exercise was “pervasive.”118 Principal Lee had
selected a religious speaker to give a religious message at a public school
function supervised by public school officials.119 Moreover, Lee gave the
rabbi guidelines for the prayer and informed him that the prayer should be
nonsectarian.120 Though Lee’s directive to have a nonsectarian prayer was a
good faith effort to appeal to all religious believers, it did not alleviate the fact
that the prayer bore the imprint of the State.121 Additionally, just as the Engel
and Schempp Courts reasoned that the ability to be excused from participating
in prayers or Bible reading did not remedy the Establishment Clause
violation,122 Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that the prayers were
acceptable because graduation was voluntary.123 After all, given the years of
hard work that students put in to attain graduation, as well as the importance of
the occasion to the students’ families, few students would forgo the event.124

111. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: COURTS, KIDS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 283 (Peter Irons
ed., 2000).
112. Id. The Weismans attended the graduation. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 584.
113. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
678 (1984)).
117. Id. at 586–87.
118. Id. at 587.
119. See id. at 586–90.
120. Id. at 588.
121. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 588–90.
122. See supra Part I.C and accompanying text.
123. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595.
124. Id. at 586, 595. Justice Kennedy wrote that, given the circumstances, the school “ha[d]
compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of singular
importance to every student, one the objecting student had no real alternative to avoid.” Id. at
598.
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Justice Kennedy then shifted to the subtle but inherently coercive elements
of the prayer:
What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that
the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may
appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the
machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy. . . . The undeniable
fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence
during the invocation and benediction. . . . Of course, in our culture standing or
remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or simple respect for the
views of others. And no doubt some persons who have no desire to join a
prayer have little objection to standing as a sign of respect for those who do.
But for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that
she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not
125
allow, the injury is no less real.

Distinguishing the case at bar from Marsh v. Chambers, where the Court found
that prayers offered at the opening of a state legislature did not violate the
Establishment Clause,126 Justice Kennedy emphasized that Congressmen were
free to come and go at any time and that there would be many reasons for them
to do so.127 In contrast, the students in Weisman had little personal autonomy
at the graduation ceremony; the school controlled the choice of venue, the
selection and order of the speakers, the dress code and the organization of the
ceremony.128 Students were not free to leave as they pleased but were faced
with a Hobson’s choice: stand for the prayer or protest.129 The brevity of the
prayer in no way lessened the severity of the encroachment. To argue that a
brief prayer is only a minor inconvenience or trivial encroachment upon one’s
religious liberty is to diminish not only the religious beliefs of the dissenter but
also to diminish the importance of the prayer to those who support it.130
Finally, Justice Kennedy again dismissed the argument that religious dissenters
could avoid the prayers by staying home. Government, he noted, may not
force people to surrender their constitutional rights to attend graduation.131
Interestingly, though Justice Kennedy’s opinion expressly states that it is
not addressing whether adults could be coerced,132 it does not reject such a
premise either, for it acknowledges that Establishment Clause concerns “may

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 592–93.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1984).
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 597.
See id. at 596.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 596.
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
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not be limited to the context of schools, [though] it is most pronounced
there.”133 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy was clear that coercion was sufficient
but not necessary to find an Establishment Clause violation. Echoing
Madison’s concern that establishment of religion is but a step toward religious
persecution, Justice Kennedy wrote that history had repeatedly shown that
“what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a
policy to indoctrinate and coerce.”134
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,135 the most recent school
prayer case to reach the Court, coercion was again an integral part of the
Court’s Establishment Clause analysis. Santa Fe, Texas, located
approximately thirty miles southeast of Houston, is a town with a largely
white, homogeneous population, a history of racial tension136 and an alleged
longstanding tradition of ignoring Establishment Clause violations.137 The
controversy stemmed from the Santa Fe Independent School District’s (the
“District”) practice of allowing the Santa Fe High School student council
chaplain to offer prayers over the District’s public address system before home
football games.138 After the constitutionality of this practice was challenged
by two students, both of whom were members of religious minorities,139 the
District amended its “Prayer at Football Games” policy.140 The new policy put
the issue to a vote.141 Students would be allowed to vote on whether a
“statement or invocation” should be delivered before each football game to
solemnize the event, and, if so, students would then choose the speaker.142 The
policy stipulated that the “message and/or invocation” would be left to the
elected speaker’s discretion.143
Despite the changes in the school policy, the district court, guided by the
Court’s reasoning in Lee v. Weisman, held that the practice of delivering
prayers before football games coerced students to participate in religious

133. Id. at 592.
134. Id. at 591–92.
135. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
136. IRONS, supra note 16, at 137. The fact that Santa Fe is white has much to do with the
town’s history of racial animosity. Though neighboring towns are nearly one-third black, Santa
Fe is ninety-five percent white. Its homogeneity also stretches to its religious composition, with
only one Jewish family in the town. Id. at 137–38.
137. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295 (noting the District’s alleged history of promoting
religion, such as encouraging students to join religious clubs or attend religious revivals,
distributing Bibles on school grounds, and letting students deliver prayers during graduation
ceremonies).
138. Id. at 294.
139. Id. One of the students was Mormon; the other was Catholic. Id.
140. Id. at 297–98.
141. Id. at 298.
142. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 298–99 n.6.
143. Id. at 298.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

ESTABLISHMENT AND EXCLUSION

607

exercises and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.144 The court of
appeals affirmed based upon Fifth Circuit precedent that “school-encouraged
prayer” at “school-related sporting events” ran afoul of the Establishment
Clause.145
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens held the District’s prayer
policy unconstitutional.146 Much like the district court had done, Justice
Stevens applied the principles of Weisman.147 He disagreed with the District’s
assertion that it had properly divorced itself from the religious messages
through its claim that any religious messages would be the students’ private
speech.148 Rather, the signs signifying the school’s endorsement of the
religious messages were plainly visible to any reasonable person: the school
policy created a limited forum where only one speaker could give the message;
the message was subject to the school district’s regulations; the policy’s use of
the words “invocation” and “solemnize” contained religious overtones; and the
message was delivered at a school event on school property over the school’s
public address system that was under the control of school officials.149 Based
upon the totality of the circumstances, including the district’s history of
supporting prayer, it was clear that the school was endorsing a particular
religious practice. In doing so, the District sent the message to those in the
religious minority “that they [were] outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.”150
The District also failed in its attempt to distinguish Weisman by arguing
that attendance at football games was voluntary.151 For those students who
were athletes, cheerleaders or band members, attendance at the pre-game
ceremony was mandatory.152 Moreover, Justice Stevens maintained that such
events were extremely important rituals to high school students, and students
should not be forced to choose between isolating themselves socially and
“avoiding personally offensive religious rituals.”153 Such a choice violated “a
tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to
forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to
state-sponsored religious practice.”154 Finally, Justice Stevens lambasted the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 301.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301–02.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303–08.
Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
Id. at 311.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
Id.
Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
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election process adopted by the District.155 The purpose of the Bill of Rights
was to forbid one from surrendering his fundamental rights to the majority.156
The District’s election process ensured that the only religious views that would
be heard were those of the majority.157 The majoritarian nature of the process
also stimulated divisiveness between religious groups.158 Thus, the District
violated the central purpose of the Establishment Clause—to prevent religious
strife.
II. EXTENDING THE PROTECTIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TO
ADULTS
A.

The Case of Warnock v. Archer—Background Facts

In the fall of 1997, Steve Warnock joined the DeValls Bluff School
District where he worked as an art teacher and part-time bus driver.159
Warnock alleged that the school carried on various religious practices, which
included reading the Bible over the school public address system at the
beginning of each school day and offering prayers at mandatory employee
meetings and trainings.160 The prayers were generally delivered by Charles
Archer, the school district superintendent (who had hired Warnock), though
other individuals in charge of trainings sometimes offered the prayers.161
Warnock objected to Archer about the prayers, but his concerns fell on
deaf ears. Only after Warnock requested legal assistance from the ACLU did
the practice of Bible reading end.162 However, the other prayers continued
despite Warnock’s repeated requests to Archer that they be stopped.163 At one
point, when Archer was going to give a prayer at the faculty convocation,
Warnock rose and voiced his objection again:
I said, Mr. Archer, it’s against the law to pray, you know, establish a religion
in school and pray. And he turns and his body was taunt [sic] with me, and
this was in front of the whole faculty, and he looks at me, he goes, yes, Mr.

155. Id. at 304–06.
156. Id. at 304–05; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
157. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304–06.
158. Id. at 311.
159. Brief of Appellee at 4–5, Warnock v. Archer, Nos. 02-3322, 03-1422 (8th Cir. Sept. 1,
2003).
160. Id. at 4. One of Warnock’s colleagues, Mary Craig, confirmed his belief that religion
pervaded the school atmosphere. She noted colleagues repeatedly asked her whether she was a
Christian, and she claimed the perception among the faculty was that a person who was not a
Christian was a bad person. Id. at 11–12.
161. Id. at 4. See also Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 2004).
162. Brief of Appellee, supra note 159, at 13. The readings stopped in October 1998 before
the ACLU could pursue legal action. Id.
163. Id.
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Warnock, I’m aware of the recent Supreme Court ruling, but I’m going to do it
anyway. . . . [A]nd during that same meeting, Mr. Eads [who delivered the
prayers at bus-driver meetings] stood up and said, anybody who has a problem
164
with us doing Christian prayer can get up and leave.

Warnock contended that the ability to leave the room during the prayers did
not alleviate the situation because it singled him out:
And that makes me feel like I’m not a part of that community. I’m—I’m—I’m
separated out. I’m lesser, inferior or, you know, just—I—I didn’t take this
public school job to watch this school endorse and practice a religion. And I
165
found it very insulting that I had to go through all this, and damaging.

Warnock alleged that his challenge to the prayers had several negative
consequences. He claimed that he was ostracized,166 that his room was not
maintained as well as those who were in favor of the prayer and that he was
harassed by students and colleagues.167 Though Warnock continued to receive
positive teaching evaluations, he felt that his job was threatened168 and
complained that the hostile work environment caused him mental stress and
anxiety.169
B.

The Legal Challenge

Warnock filed a Section 1983 suit against Archer and the Devalls Bluff
School District, claiming, inter alia, that Archer had violated the Establishment
Clause by delivering prayers at mandatory teacher meetings.170 The district
court ruled that the prayers violated the First Amendment, and it enjoined the
district “from offering prayers at any meeting that Mr. Warnock is required to
attend.”171
The Eighth Circuit noted that, based on Court precedent, it was unclear
whether the Establishment Clause forbids school-sponsored prayer where only
adults are present.172 Nevertheless, applying the endorsement test, the Eighth

164. Id. at 14. Archer admitted that he had made such a statement. Id.
165. Id. at 16–17.
166. Id. at 16. Mary Craig testified that many members of the faculty were angry at Warnock
for objecting to the prayer. When she first inquired as to whom Mr. Warnock was, she was told
by colleagues that “she did not want to know him.” Id. at 12.
167. Brief of Appellee, supra note 159, at 17–24. Warnock explained that one of the forms of
harassment was that he repeatedly received Christian propaganda in his school mailbox. Id. at 20.
168. The record indicates that in August 1999, Archer approached Warnock and told him that
he was resuming the Bible readings with the full support of the school board. Archer then asked
whether Warnock would try to stop the readings. Warnock indicated that he would take legal
action. Id. at 13.
169. Id. at 23.
170. Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 2004).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1080.
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Circuit declared the practice unconstitutional.173 In making its decision, the
court noted that the prayers were not isolated events, but had been consistently
given at mandatory teacher meetings and offered by the school official in
charge of the meeting.174 Based upon these facts, a reasonable person would
believe that the school had endorsed or approved of religious practice.175
Thus, the school violated the First Amendment by establishing a preference for
religion.
Although the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the
prayers violated the Establishment Clause, it found the district court’s remedy
to be lacking.176 In effect, the district court’s injunction allowed school
officials to continue the prayers provided that Warnock was not required to
attend the meetings.177 Simply allowing Warnock to be excused did not
remedy the constitutional violation in the court’s view:
We think that the difficulty with this approach is that it either conceives of the
constitutional violation in terms of Mr. Warnock’s subjective feelings of
offense, or is premised on the proposition that the primary establishment clause
violation in this case lies in the fact that Mr. Warnock was being coerced or
religiously indoctrinated by the state. . . . [W]e believe that it is the
government’s endorsement of a particular religious message that constitutes
the constitutional violation here, not the effects . . . on Mr. Warnock’s
178
psyche.

Warnock’s claims of ostracism and harassment were immaterial to the
Establishment Clause issue. Moreover, the court found Warnock’s “perceived
slights and personal fears” trivial179 and disputed any notion that he could be
coerced or indoctrinated given the fact that he was “a strong-willed adult” who
had a contractual relationship with the district.180
C. Can Adults Be Coerced?—An Analysis of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence in Other Governmental Settings
In holding that the school district’s practice of offering prayers at
mandatory teacher functions impermissibly endorsed religion and violated the
Establishment Clause, the Eighth Circuit reached the proper result. As the
Supreme Court has consistently noted, coercion is a sufficient but not a

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 1081.
Warnock, 380 F.3d at 1081.
Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1083.
Warnock, 380 F.3d at 1080.
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necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation.181 The argument
makes sense from a logical perspective, too. If the Framers intended the First
Amendment to prevent only religious coercion, the Establishment Clause
would be meaningless.182 Under such an analysis, a state could establish an
official religion provided it did not force anyone to belong to or subsidize the
state religion.183 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit’s ruling makes sense given the
factual similarity between Weisman, Santa Fe, and Warnock. In Weisman, the
school district had impermissibly endorsed religion and violated the
Establishment Clause when it selected a religious leader to give a religious
message (the content of which was constrained by Principal Lee’s guidelines)
to public school students at a public school function under the control of public
school officials. Similarly, in Santa Fe, the Court reasoned that the school
district had endorsed the pre-game prayers because it had created a limited
forum where only one speaker could deliver the message; the message was
controlled by school guidelines; and the prayers were delivered over the
school’s public address system at a school event that was controlled by school
officials. Here, Warnock—a public school employee—had been subjected to
prayers delivered at mandatory teacher functions by public school officials
who controlled not only the message but also who could deliver the message.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit’s declaration that coercion was immaterial in
Establishment Clause cases ignores not only the jurisprudence of Weisman and
Santa Fe, but it also ignores the fact that endorsement is inherently coercive.
Though the Supreme Court has not expressly stated that the Establishment
Clause would apply to school-sponsored prayers if only adults were present,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Weisman implicitly concedes the possibility. It
seems unreasonable to believe that the Establishment Clause’s protections are
age-dependent, that “like Trix cereal, [the clause] is [just] ‘for kids.’”184 Are
we to believe that the prayer held unconstitutional in Weisman would not have
been coercive had it simply been delivered a few minutes after graduation?
Analysis of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in other governmental settings
where adults are present provides a useful explanation.
The only Supreme Court case addressing government-sponsored prayer
before adults is Marsh v. Chambers.185 In that case, a Nebraska state legislator
challenged the state’s practice of opening each of its legislative sessions with a

181. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
182. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 621 (Souter, J., concurring).
183. I am intellectually indebted to Justice O’Connor for this argument. O’Connor posed the
same type of question during oral arguments in Weisman. For a partial transcript of the oral
argument, see MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 111, at 286.
184. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 23, Warnock v. Archer, No. 02-3322 (8th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2004).
185. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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prayer delivered by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid with tax dollars.186
Applying the Lemon test, the Eighth Circuit held that the prayers violated the
Establishment Clause.187 The Supreme Court reversed.188 In upholding the
prayers, the Court emphasized the longstanding history of legislative prayer by
pointing out that the First Congress had adopted a similar practice.189
Similarly, the Nebraska legislature had opened its sessions with prayer for over
100 years.190 The State was not conducting a religious exercise but merely
acknowledging the religious views held by most Americans.191
Though an argument can be made that Marsh should be controlling in
cases such as Warnock, the argument fails to note key differences between the
situations. As Justice Kennedy noted in Weisman, legislators are free to come
and go as they please and do so for a variety of reasons.192 Warnock’s
presence at the meetings was mandatory.193 Furthermore, in Warnock, given
the habitual delivery of the prayers, it would become readily apparent that
Warnock was leaving the room to avoid the prayers.194 Finally, the Court in
Marsh placed tremendous emphasis on the fact that legislative prayers enjoyed
a longstanding history.195 Of course, it is questionable whether a practice
should be considered constitutional simply because it has occurred for a long
time. After all, Madison had contended that the prayers before Congress were
unconstitutional, a failure of politicians to live up to the ideals of the
Constitution.196 And the fact that Marsh has not been the basis for any further
Supreme Court rulings demonstrates that it is an outlier in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.197
Unlike the Supreme Court, lower courts have confronted the issue of
government-sponsored prayer at university graduations. In Tanford v. Brand,
the Seventh Circuit ruled that prayers offered during commencement
ceremonies at Indiana University did not violate the First Amendment.198 Each
year, the university chose different speakers to deliver a nondenominational

186. Id. at 784–85.
187. Id. at 785–86.
188. Id. at 786.
189. Id. at 787–88. The majority opinion also mentioned that the Court had a similar practice.
Id. at 786.
190. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788–89.
191. Id. at 792.
192. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).
193. Brief of Appellee, supra note 159, at 4.
194. Id.
195. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786–792.
196. Madison, supra note 22, at 27.
197. See Pihos, supra note 8, at 1360.
198. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997).
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invocation and benediction at the graduation services.199 Three students and a
law professor at the university sought to enjoin the practice by arguing that it
violated the Establishment Clause.200 In finding for the university, the court
mentioned that those who attended the graduation ceremonies were adults.201
As such, they were not likely to be coerced or indoctrinated but could simply
ignore the offensive remarks. In addition, the court reasoned that the prayers
were simply an acknowledgment of religious belief and were intended to
solemnize the event.202
Tanford would seem to support the argument that the Establishment
Clause’s protections should not apply to adults as they do to children, that
Warnock was incorrectly decided. However, the facts in Tanford are clearly
distinguishable: many students did not attend the commencement exercises,
those in attendance generally did not rise for the prayer, and there was an
alternative afternoon ceremony that did not have prayers.203 And, unlike in
Warnock, it was customary for students and faculty to arrive and leave
throughout the ceremony, with some running late, others leaving early, and
still others excusing themselves to get a drink or use the restroom.204
Though the Seventh Circuit in Tanford dismissed the idea that adults could
be coerced, it implicitly accepted such a possibility in Kerr v. Farrey.205 In
Kerr, the plaintiff was a prisoner who was required by the warden to attend
substance abuse meetings.206 The only program for the prisoners was
Narcotics Anonymous, which had a 12-step program that was intertwined with
religious messages.207 For example, one step called for participants to admit
their misdeeds to God, while another “asked Him to remove [the]
shortcomings.”208 The court stated that these religious messages, coupled with
other religious messages habitually offered at the meetings, amounted to a
governmental endorsement of religion.209 In addition, the court pointed out
that failure to attend the sessions could negatively impact the inmate’s chances
for parole as well as his inmate’s security risk rating.210 Though the warden
claimed that no inmate had been penalized for failing to participate in the
program, the Seventh Circuit ruled that forcing the plaintiff to choose between
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Tanford, 104 F.3d at 984–85.
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attending the program and enduring the religious messages or forgoing the
program and risking his parole eligibility violated the Establishment Clause.211
While the court never used the word “coercion” in its opinion, Kerr
demonstrates that adults can indeed be coerced, and its holding supports the
notion that one may not be forced to submit his religious rights to another.212
III. WHY THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE’S PROTECTIONS SHOULD BE
EXTENDED TO ADULTS, AND THE COST OF FAILING TO DO SO
The argument that adults cannot be coerced by government endorsement of
religious practices is deficient in many respects, not the least of which is the
fact that courts have generally cited no supporting evidence when making this
claim; the proposition is treated as if it is self-evident.213 Concededly, adults,
such as Warnock, are not likely to be indoctrinated by such prayers offered at
governmental functions. As the Tanford court noted, adults may simply ignore
religious remarks with which they disagree.214 The argument could also be
made that Warnock could avoid the prayers by leaving the room or even
finding a new job. Yet, the Supreme Court has held that one need not
surrender his constitutional rights in exchange for public employment,215
similar to the way that Justices Kennedy and Stevens declared that students
need not forgo their constitutional rights to attend graduation or a football
game.216 Ultimately, though, the argument is deficient in that it fails to see that
such endorsement is inherently coercive, fosters religious divisiveness and
sends the message that religious dissenters are outsiders and not equal
members of their communities. Therefore school-sponsored prayers produce
the very evils that, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the
Establishment Clause was intended to prevent.217
As James Madison knew from history, government endorsement of
religion often ends in violence and persecution.218 Unfortunately, this reality
has not changed since Madison’s time.219 In the aforementioned school prayer

211. Id. at 479–80.
212. See generally Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
213. See Deanna N. Pike, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the
Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1365–66 (2005) (“When
such important constitutional guarantees are at stake, it is surprising that the Supreme Court has
perpetuated this assumption without any meaningful discussion.”).
214. See Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 983–85 (7th Cir. 1997).
215. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
216. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290; Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
217. See supra Part II.
218. See Madison, supra note 22, 4–7.
219. The 1844 “Bible Riots” of Philadelphia is an example. It was common for public
schools to begin the day with Bible reading and the Lord’s Prayer. When Catholics requested
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cases, those individuals who dared to challenge the school-endorsed prayers
met tremendous resistance, and it was not only the children who
suffered. Edward Schempp received harassing phone calls and letters, and his
children were taunted at school.220 The plaintiffs in Santa Fe had to litigate the
case anonymously due to fear of reprisals.221 Even so, the district court noted
that the school officials tried to ferret out their identities, which prompted the
district court to threaten severe criminal and civil sanctions if the activity
continued.222
Debbie Mason, who was an outspoken critic of the prayers in Santa Fe,
received threatening phone calls.223 Her daughters were physically assaulted,
and she and her family were ostracized from the community.224 In particular,
the Chair of the School Board, John Couch, proclaimed to those in attendance
at a board meeting that Debbie’s children were not Christians.225 The fact that
Debbie’s children attended the First Baptist Church and that Couch personally
knew Debbie and her family did not stop Couch from making the claim.226
The Masons also suffered economically. With Debbie’s husband no longer
able to find work, Debbie had to work for three years at a fast-food restaurant
to make ends meet.227
Although religious dissenters must face potential threats and harassment
when challenging the establishment of religion, they also must face being
marginalized and singled out in their communities. Though the ostracism and
marginalization may not be as grave as threats of violence, the injury is still
very real. Case after case bears this out. For instance, Edward Schempp
testified before the trial court in Schempp that he feared his children would be
singled out and viewed as atheists or communists if he requested they be
excused from the Bible readings.228 The Masons, who supported the plaintiffs
in Santa Fe, bore the brunt of smears that claimed they were not Christians or,
even worse, were devil worshippers.229 Perhaps the most intriguing example
of how government establishment of religion encourages divisiveness and

that the local school board allow Catholic students to read their version of the Bible, conflict
erupted. In response, Protestants burned down two churches. Three days of rioting ended with
thirteen deaths. IRONS, supra note 16, at 20–21.
220. Id. at 29.
221. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294–95 n.1.
222. Id.
223. IRONS, supra note 16, at 167.
224. Id. at 166–69.
225. Id. at 163.
226. Id. One of Debbie’s daughters was even labeled a devil worshipper by her classmates.
Id. at 140.
227. Id. at 169.
228. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208–09 n.3 (1963).
229. IRONS, supra note 16, at 140.
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further marginalizes minority groups involves John Couch. In an interview
with Professor Peter Irons, Couch (the School Board Chair who had claimed
the Mason daughters were not Christians) recalled that the prayer controversy
was simply the product of “a couple of disgruntled parents . . . [who] were
always complaining about something.”230 Furthermore, Couch’s analysis of
why the Fifth Circuit ruled against him invokes themes of religion and race:
So we went to the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans, and Lisa Brown argued the
case there. I knew we were kind of in trouble, because I looked at the makeup
of the three judges. We had a conservative that Reagan had appointed, which I
thought was good. We had another guy that I think Jimmy Carter or Clinton
had appointed, he was a black judge, and I figured we were going to lose there.
Then we had another guy that Nixon had appointed, but he was Jewish. And
the comments around what you could or couldn’t say, invoking the name of
231
Jesus Christ, you can kind of guess how he was going to vote.

Couch gives no descriptions of the Reagan appointee, other than to mention
that he is a conservative, which Couch correlates with being “good.”232 He
does not identify the judge’s race, religion or gender. Yet, when he describes
the second judge—a Carter or Clinton appointee—Couch throws in the fact
that the judge is an ethnic minority, that the judge was black.233 And for the
last judge, who apparently has some redeeming value as a Nixon appointee,
Couch seems to lament that the judge was a religious minority, a Jew.234 The
lesson is this: when government establishes religion, those who are opposed to
the establishment are transformed into outsiders.
As the cases in this comment have shown, religious dissenters, even those
who are adults, are in a precarious position when government establishes a
preference for religion. Courts may argue that adults cannot be coerced, but it
is doubtful that most people are willing to risk physical threats, harassment and
ostracism that can accompany the choice to opt out of such governmentsponsored religious exercises. First, although Weisman focused only on the
coercive effect of peer pressure on elementary and secondary students,235 the
reality is that adults are also susceptible to pressure to conform to societal and
cultural norms. For instance, in his article, Why I’m Against Pre-game Prayers,
evangelical Christian Gary Christenot recounts how—while stationed with the
military in a region of Hawaii where “Christians . . . were in the very distinct

230. Id. at 173.
231. Id. at 177–78.
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233. Id. Whether Couch meant that he expected this judge to rule against him because (a) he
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construction.
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235. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

ESTABLISHMENT AND EXCLUSION

617

minority” and where there was “a Shinto or Buddhist shrine on every
corner”—he was forced to choose between following social conventions or his
religious beliefs due to a simple prayer delivered before a football game he
attended:
Coming from a fairly traditional Southern upbringing, I was not at all initially
surprised when a voice came over the PA and asked everyone to rise for the
invocation. I had been through this same ritual at many other high school
events and thought nothing of it, so to our feet my wife and I stood, bowed our
heads and prepared to partake of the prayer. But to our extreme dismay, the
clergyman who took the microphone and began to pray was not a Protestant
minister or a Catholic priest, but a Buddhist priest who proceeded to offer up
prayers and intonations to god-head figures that our tradition held to be pagan.
We were frozen in shock and incredulity! What to do? To continue to stand
and observe this prayer would represent a betrayal of our own faith and imply
the honoring of a pagan deity that was anathema to our beliefs.
To sit would be an act of extreme rudeness and disrespect in the eyes of
our . . . hosts and neighbors, who value above all other things deference and
respect in their social interactions.
...
The point is this: I am a professional, educated and responsible man who is
strong in his faith and is quite comfortable debating the social and political
issues of the day. Yet when placed in a setting where the majority culture
proved hostile to my faith and beliefs, I became paralyzed with indecision and
could not act decisively to defend and proclaim my own beliefs. I felt instantly
236
ostracized and viewed myself as a foreigner in my own land.

Second, while it may seem trivial that one who opposes school-sponsored
prayers or other government endorsed religious activities is labeled a
communist or atheist, those labels still evoke negative feelings from the
American public. According to polls, fifty-three percent of Americans would
not vote for an otherwise qualified presidential candidate if that person was an
atheist.237 This percentage is higher than those who would not vote for a
homosexual.238 A study released by the American Sociological Association
even showed that Americans had greater antipathy for atheists than they had

236. Gary B. Christenot, Why I’m Against Pre-game Prayers, CHURCH & STATE (Oct. 2006),
available at http://www.au.org/media/church-and-state/archives/2006/10/why-irsquom-ag.html.
237. Jeffrey M. Jones, Some Americans Reluctant to Vote for Mormon, 72-Year-Old
Presidential Candidates, GALLUP, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/26611/SomeAmericans-Reluctant-Vote-Mormon-72YearOld-Presidential-Candidates.aspx.
238. Id. Only forty-three percent of Americans would not vote for someone simply because
he orshe was gay. Id.
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for Muslims, homosexuals, immigrants or other ethnic minorities.239 The study
concluded that atheists are seen as being concerned only with themselves as
opposed to the public good, and that atheists are responsible for the rise of
immorality and decline of traditional values.240 Thus, school-sponsored
prayers serve to incite and justify discrimination against those who are deemed
to be outsiders to their communities. Nevertheless, as one scholar has noted,
the problem for religious dissenters is that the greatest harm they generally
suffer (i.e., ostracism and harassment by the community or other nongovernmental actors) is not actionable under the Constitution.241 Nor can they
recover for their injuries under tort theory (e.g., a hostile work environment
lawsuit against the school district) unless they meet the difficult task of
proving that the school-sponsored prayers directly caused the injury, not just
fostered the conditions for it.
Third, though the Eighth Circuit listed Warnock’s contractual relationship
with his school district as a reason he could not be coerced,242 the court failed
to consider that not all states have tenure.243 Therefore, challenging schoolsponsored prayers that are favored by the majority carries with it the potential
for non-renewal of a teacher’s contract. Although federal law makes it illegal
to discriminate on the basis of one’s religion,244 it is often difficult to prove
such discrimination is the reason for non-renewal, particularly where the state
allows school districts to non-renew teacher contracts without giving any
reason for non-renewal.
Lastly, the Warnock court seems to overlook the fact that an adult who
challenges school-sponsored prayers and prevails legally may still lose in
practice. Judicial rulings are not self-enforcing. Even after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Santa Fe, the unconstitutional religious practices did not
cease; they continued unabated.245 As Debbie Mason noted when asked about
the continuing constitutional violations in Santa Fe: “What people forget is, the
courts rule, Judge Kent ruled, the Fifth Circuit court ruled, the Supreme Court

239. Penny Edgell et al., Atheists As “Other”: Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership
in American Society, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 2, 211–34 (Apr. 2006).
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241. See FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 137–38 (1999).
242. Warrock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 2004).
243. See, e.g., Kevin Lungwitz, A Review of Teacher Contracts, TEX. STATE TEACHERS
ASSOC., http://www.tsta.org/legal/current/contracts.shtml (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). The Texas
State Teachers Association notes that most teachers in Texas school districts are employed under
term contracts for a set number of years, although a handful of districts offer “continuing
contracts,” which provide some due process protections for teachers who are dismissed. Id.
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
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ruled. . . . [T]hey can rule all they want, but when [the majority] break[s] the
rules they don’t do anything to them.”246
In August 2007, while perusing the website for his former community’s
newspaper, this author stumbled across a message directed toward him in the
community blog postings. The message was short but direct: “You got rid of
the prayers that 99.9% of people wanted. At Robert E. Lee High School, we’re
glad you are gone.” A trivial injury? Certainly. A petty insult? Perhaps. But
it should serve as a reminder that, as James Madison noted, when the
Establishment Clause is violated, even minor encroachments are but a step
toward religious persecution.
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